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CRIMINAL LAW-THE DISSIPATION OF
REASONABLE DILIGENCE-COMMONWEALTH
V. ROSARIO, 74 N.E. 3D 599 (MASS. 2017).
Rule 30 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure
authorizes judges to grant new trials where there is evidence that justice did
not prevail in the prior trial.1 Accessibility to new trials depends heavily on
whether the defendant can establish newly discovered evidence, or, in other
words, evidence not discoverable at the time of trial.2 In Commonwealth v.
Rosario3 -an arson case-the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
addressed whether Rosario's new psychological diagnosis, as well as
advancements in fire science, constituted newly discovered evidence
warranting a new trial.' Although the court found that Rosario's new
psychological diagnosis was not newly discovered, it held that the
underdeveloped fire science at the time of his trial casted doubt on the arson
conviction, and ultimately granted a new trial.'
During the early hours of March 5, 1982, a fire spread throughout
6
the first floor of a multi-unit apartment located in Lowell, Massachusetts.
The fire spread quickly and killed eight people, and as a result, the arson unit
was contacted to investigate how the fire started.' The arson unit determined
most of the damage occurred on the front right and left sides of the exterior
of the building, as well as the inside of the first-floor apartment.' Despite
the absence of wicks and flammable liquid, the arson unit found that the burn

1

MASS. R. CRIM. P. 30(b) (permitting judges to grant new trials where "justice may not have
been done.").
2 See Commonwealth v. Grace, 491 N.E.2d 246,248 (Mass. 1986) (discussing how to establish
newly discovered evidence).
3 74 N.E.3d 599 (Mass. 2017).
4 See id. at 603-06 (reiterating issue regarding new evidence).
5 See id at 609 (affirming superior court judge's order granting a new trial). The new fire
research evidence, in combination with the doubt of the voluntary nature of the statements made
by Rosario, could allow for an alternative theory. Id Taken together, these two factors could have
persuaded the jury in ways that are unjust to the defendant. Id.
6 Id. at 601-02 (identifying locations of alleged arson). In addition to the fire, there was "the
sound of breaking glass." Id. at 601. Fire had consumed the whole building by the time the police
arrived to the location-minutes after the emergency call was placed. Id. It took approximately
one hour for the fire to cease. Id
' Id. (explaining why arson unit was called).
Rosario, 74 N.E.3d at 601-02 (addressing resulting damage). The arson unit studied the burn
patterns on the first-floor apartment's hallway, living room, and kitchen, concluding that the fire
travelled by the floor and baseboards. Id.
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patterns were compatible with a flammable liquid, described as a "Molotov
Cocktail." 9
Multiple witnesses to the fire contributed information to police.'o
Upon further investigation, Rosario became a suspect of the alleged arson
and was interrogated by police on March 6 and March 7." Throughout the
interrogation, Rosario's mental state depreciated.1 2 The interrogation
continued, despite Rosario's apparent incapacity, and Rosario made two
statements to police relating to the fire.' 3 The police officers wrote down
three statements at the end of the interrogation, all of which were signed by
Rosario." After Rosario signed the statements, he was arrested.1 5
Once Rosario was taken into police custody and processed, he lost
all mental capacity.'" He was taken to the house of correction in Billerica,

9 Id at 602 (clarifying Molotov cocktail evidence). The arson unit found that the fire resulted
from a Molotov cocktail that was purposefully placed in the front hallway into the kitchen. Id. See
also Molotov Cocktail. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2017. https://www.merriamwebster.com (21 Jan. 2017) (defining Molotov cocktail). A Molotov cocktail is a "a crude bomb
made of a bottle filled with a flammable liquid (such as gasoline) and usually fitted with a wick
(such as a saturated rag) that is ignited just before the bottle is hurled." Id.
to Rosario, 74 N.E.3d at 602 (reviewing witnesses' statements). A witness noted that there
were three men outside of the building immediately before the fire. Id. Another witness emphasized
that the defendant used drugs in her apartment earlier in the night, and that she observed Rosario
breaking windows after she learned of the fire. Id. Additionally, Red Cross employees cared for
Rosario's hand injury and brought him to the hospital. Id.
11 See id. (describing nature of interrogation). The interrogation took place at the fire
department headquarters. Id. The police provided an assisting interpreter for Rosario, since his
native language was Spanish. Id.
12 See id. 602-03 (acknowledging Rosario's mental state during interrogation). When Rosario
first arrived at the fire department headquarters, he was relaxed and cooperative. Id. Later in the
night, however, he claimed that he "was beginning to hear voices." Id
13 Id. at 602 (noting Rosario's mental state during ongoing questioning). Following the two
statements provided by Rosario, an officer mentioned that they had "'certain information' and
wanted 'to know if he was part of it."' Id. Soon after, Rosario began to cry and pray in front of the
officers for approximately ten to twenty minutes, but eventually relaxed. Id.
14 See id. at 602-03 (summarizing Rosario's statements). Rosario signed the first statement at
12:15 A.M., conceding that he was at the scene of the burning apartment, and broke a window to
help save children inside the building. Id. at 602. Subsequently, Rosario signed a second statement
indicating that he was the designated "look out" for two other men involved in the crime. Id.
Rosario claimed that it was one of these two men that threw the Molotov cocktail into the apartment
complex. Id. Finally, in the last signed statement, Rosario admitted to utilizing the Molotov
cocktails to ignite the building, along with the other two men. Id. The final statement also
mentioned that prior to going to a bar that night, he observed the two other men creating three
Molotov cocktails ill his basement. Id. at 602-03. Lastly, the statement mentioned that one of the
men wanted to light this fire "to get [one of the victims] over drugs." Id. at 603.
15 Rosario, 74 N.E.3d at 603 (stating Rosario was arrested at 6:30 A.M. after
signing
statements).
16 Id. (explaining Rosario's mental state). Rosario stated multiple times "that he was 'the son
of God,' believed that the back of his head had been cut off, and did not recognize his girl friend
when she came to visit him." Id
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At trial, the defense
Massachusetts, for a psychiatric evaluation.17
emphasized that Rosario's statements to police were involuntary in nature,
and Rosario was actually near the burning building because he went with his
friends to a nearby house to buy drugs.'" At the end of Rosario's 1983 trial,
the jury rendered a guilty verdict for one count of arson and eight counts of
murder in the second degree." In 2012, twenty-nine years after his trial,
Rosario motioned for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence,
resulting in a six-day evidentiary hearing that addressed the police
20
interrogation, Rosario's psychiatric diagnosis, and new fire evidence. The
17 Id. (noting Rosario's transfer for a psychiatric evaluation). Psychiatrists claimed Rosario
was psychotic. Id. Upon treatment, however, he regained his mental capacity and was deemed
competent to stand trial without any recurring symptoms. Id. See also Psychosis, Healthline.com,
http://www.healthline.com/health/psychosis (last visited on Sept. 10, 2017). Healthline defines
psychosis as "an impaired relationship with reality. And it is a symptom of serious mental disorders.
People who are psychotic may have either hallucinations or delusions." Id.
1 Rosario, 74 N.E.3d at 603 (recounting defense's perspective on case). Rosario testified to
injuring his hand by breaking a window to help save children from the burning building. Id In
addition, the defense asserted that the statements provided and signed to the police were involuntary
because of his psychosis. Id. Rosario also stated that he did not recall telling the police any of the
signed statements. Id Additionally, Rosario asserted that he was not familiar with the term
"Molotov cocktail" until the police began interrogating him. Id. The judge informed the jury on
the humane practice rule, which emphasizes that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant's statement was voluntary. Rosario, 74 N.E.3d at 603 n.7
(Mass. 2017) (referring to Commonwealth v. Taveras, 430 N.E.2d 1198, 1205-06 (Mass. 1982)).
The jury asked the court for the transcripts of the doctors' testimony during deliberations, but the
court did not supply the requested transcripts. Id. at 603. Furthermore, the doctors' reports on
Rosario's mental state were not allowed into evidence. Id.
19 See Rosario, 74 N.E.3d at 603 (stating jury's verdict).
20 See Rosario, 74 N.E.3d at 603-06 (outlining Rosario's motion for new trial). According to
Rosario's interpreter's affidavit, Rosario did not mention that he was a "look out" for the other
men, nor did Rosario mention that he assisted in using Molotov cocktails. Id at 603-04. Further,
the interpreter mentioned that the police "suggested these details" and put them in the written
statements. Id. at 604. Notably, the first and second statements were completely translated prior to
signing, but the third statement-regarding the use of Molotov cocktails-was never translated for
Rosario. Id The interpreter acknowledged Rosario's mental incapacity during the questioning. Id.
Prior to Rosario's total incoherence, he "had referred constantly to being possessed by the devil
and to being the son of God." Id. The interpreter also revealed that Rosario admitted to taking
heroin before the questioning began. Id In addition to this new interrogation information, two new
psychiatric experts diagnosed Rosario with Delirium Tremens ("DTs"), rather than psychosis. Id.
DTs is "a withdrawal symptom occurring in persons who have developed physiological dependence
on alcohol, characterized by tremor, visual hallucinations, and autonomic instability." Delirium
Tremens, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/delirium-tremen?s-t (last visited
Jan. 4, 2018). The court in this case summarized the symptoms of DTs:

The symptoms of the condition worsen over the course of five days. Within twelve
hours, the person may be confused or agitated but knows where he is and who he is. By
the second day of withdrawal, the person may experience auditory hallucinations, as well
as a sense of persecution. The most characteristic symptoms of DTs develop on the third
day, when the person may experience visual, tactile, olfactory, and auditory
hallucinations. From the third day onward, the person becomes extremely disoriented
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motion judge found that the DTs diagnosis and fire evidence were both
newly discovered; however, the motion judge relied heavily on the new
diagnosis in granting a new trial.2 1
and agitated, and other functions of the nervous system start to break down. The
hallucinations peak at day three or day four. DTs is an acute syndrome and subsides as
the person recovers from alcohol withdrawal, typically beginning at around days five,
six, and seven.
Rosario, 74 N.E.3d at 604. At the new trial motion hearing, the defense referenced Rosario's past
head injury and substance abuse to validate his susceptibility to DTs. Id. Rosario typically began
drinking around 9:00 A.M., consuming hard liquor and a case of beer a day. Id The defense
indicated that Rosario's drinking significantly slowed after the fire, and provided evidence that
Rosario's girlfriend's son witnessed him acting in "extreme, unusual ways." Id The psychiatric
experts estimated that Rosario was concluding the second day of alcohol withdrawal, and
approaching day three when he arrived for interrogation. Id At this juncture, DTs symptoms had
consumed Rosario. Id. The court summarizes the defense's psychiatric experts' explanation for the
misdiagnosis of Rosario:
They hypothesized that because the previous psychiatrists did not examine him when his
symptoms were most aligned with delirium, by the time the defendant was diagnosed,
eight or more days after the fire, his alcohol withdrawal had progressed such that the
residual symptoms of DTs might present as a psychotic disorder. One of the experts
further hypothesized that the language barrier made it difficult to get a complete history,
including the defendant's history of alcohol abuse.
Rosario, 74 N.E.3d at 604-05. Lastly, the defense addressed new fire science at the evidentiary
hearing. Id. at 605. Equipped with the most recent fire research, two fire experts indicated that the
evidence of the fire is also equally consistent with an accidental fire, with no present flammable
liquids, and only one starting point. Id. The experts testified that the fire could have spread because
of a "flashover":
Flashover is a phenomenon that occurs when the fire goes from being controlled by fuel
to being controlled by the oxygen available in the room depending upon the ventilation.
Once flashover occurs, there is "full room involvement," where the intensity of the fireand, as a result, the bum patterns-may vary depending upon the areas of ventilation.
Once this happens, the point ofa fire's origin cannot be accurately identified because the
fire causes the most damage in areas where there is more oxygen available, generally
near doors and windows. They further explained that because irtegular curved or poolshaped patterns are common in postflashover conditions and may result from the effects
of hot gases, smoldering debris and melted plastics, the presence of flammable liquids
should be confirmed by laboratory analysis and should not be based on appearance alone.
Id. at 605. In 1982, the arson unit initially identified two damaged areas of the building that
seemingly were not connected (indicating two separate "points of origin"), but the defense's experts
at the 2014 evidentiary hearing discussed that this could have occurred because of the increasing
amount of oxygen in the areas of the building. Id. Furthermore, the defense experts denounced the
1982 arson investigator's opinion that the burn pattern near the kitchen door was a result of
flammable liquid. Id. The experts explained that new research indicates "that hot gases in one room
can cause burning on the other side of a closed door . .. [and] the blistering effect that was thought
to be consistent with the use of flammable liquid is now known to be found in many types of fires,
whether or not flammable liquids were present." Id.
21 See Rosario, 74 N.E.3d at 605-06 (summarizing motion judge's rulings). The motion judge
decided that the diagnosis of DTs "could not have been uncovered by defense counsel's due
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Massachusetts values the finality of convictions and recognizes that
a defendant does not necessarily need a perfect trial, as long as it's a fair
one.2 2 Notably, however, under Rule 30 of the Massachusetts Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a judge may grant a new trial whenever "it appears that
justice may not have been done." 23 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
precedent creates "specific standards" to aid judges in deciding whether to
24
grant a new trial, such as looking for newly discovered evidence. In order
to decipher whether the evidence is new, it "must . .. have been unknown to
the defendant or his counsel and not reasonably discoverable by them at the
time of trial."25 Merely because evidence is new does not mean that it will
guarantee a new trial: the evidence needs to be "material and credible, but
also must carry a measure of strength in support of the defendant's
position."26
When addressing newly discovered evidence, as well as the other
standards, judges sometimes need to observe how different variables work
together to create a "miscarriage ofjustice." 27 Upon the trial judge's decision
28
to grant a new trial, a higher court must review their determination. The
standard of review used by the appellate court is "abuse of discretion. "29
diligence by the time of trial," and ultimately called into question Rosario's statements under
interrogation. Id. Although the judge found the fire evidence constituted newly discovered
evidence, she did not believe it was sufficient, in isolation, to question Rosario's conviction. Id. at
606.
22 See Commonwealth v. Brescia, 29 N.E.3d 837, 845-46 (Mass. 2015) (emphasizing the right
to a fair trial); see also Commonwealth v. LeFave, 714 N.E.2d 805, 809-10 (Mass. 1999)
(reiterating value of finality regarding convictions).
23 See MAss. R. CRIM. P. 30(b) (awarding judges the ability to grant new trials when justice
has not been served).
24 See Commonwealth v. Brescia, 29 N.E.3d 837, 843-44 (Mass. 2015) (emphasizing certain
standards in granting new trials). Judges may consider a multitude of factors, including: (1) if a
prejudicial constitutional error occurred, (2) whether the result would have been different absent
non-constitutional specific error, and (3) the presence of newly discovered evidence. Id. Another
factor to be considered is effective counsel. Id. at 844 n. 10. See also Commonwealth v. Randolph,
780 N.E.2d 58, 66-67 (Mass. 2002) (discussing how trial error must have been substantial enough
to change outcome of case); Commonwealth v. Grace, 491 N.E.2d 246, 248 (Mass. 1986)
(discussing need for newly discovered evidence); Commonwealth v. Saferian, 315 N.E.2d 878,
882-83 (Mass. 1974) (establishing ineffective counsel as a reason for a new trial).
25 See Grace, 491 N.E.2d at 248 (discussing requirements for proper newly discovered
evidence). Notably, "[t]he defendant has the burden of proving that reasonable pretrial diligence
would not have uncovered the evidence." Id.
26 See id. (explaining the weight of newly discovered evidence).
27 See Brescia, 29 N.E.3d at 843-44 (noting the inquiry regarding miscarriage ofjustice). The
Brescia court addressed how multiple factors contributed to the defendant's lack of a fair trial. Id.
at 849.
28 See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 57 N.E.3d 1000, 1014 (Mass. 2016) (reviewing trial judge's
decision to grant new trial).
29 See Commonwealth v. Wright, 14 N.E.3d 294, 309 (Mass. 2014) (reiterating the "abuse of
discretion" standard during appellate review).
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Furthermore, when deciding whether a defendant made voluntary
statements, the jury must find the statements were voluntary beyond a
reasonable doubt. 30 Notably, there are circumstances where interrogation
strategy provokes false admissions by defendants, ultimately invalidating the
voluntary nature of a statement.31 Although false admissions do not neatly
fit into the category of "newly discovered evidence," judges can consider
them in addition to any newly discovered evidence to adequately assess
whether that evidence would have had an impact on the jury.3 2
In addressing and applying the applicable law, the Rosario court
affirmed the motion judge's decision to grant a new trial, but did not agree
with how she made her decision.33 The court acknowledged concerns
regarding the police interrogation and Rosario's DTs diagnosis, as they both
called into question the voluntariness of Rosario's statements to officers.3 4
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the motion judge's findings-in respect
to the interpreter's affidavit-cast doubt on the reliability of Rosario's
statements.s The court also reasoned that there were three interrogation
techniques that could have resulted in a false confession from Rosario. 36 The
30 See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 430 N.E.2d 1198, 1206 (Mass. 1982) (indicating "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard for finding voluntary statements). The justification for this high
standard lies in the fact that a defendant's confession regarding a crime is key evidence of "proof
of guilt." Id (quoting Clifton v. United States, 371 F.2d 354, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1966)) (concurring
opinion).
31 See Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 950 N.E.2d 421, 428-29 (Mass. 2011) (mentioning how
interrogations can provoke false confessions). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court does not
endorse police utilizing "deception or trickery," as it calls into question whether the defendant
willingly made a confession. Id at 429.
32 See Ellis, 57 N.E.3d at 1017 ("The determination of whether newly discovered evidence
would have been a real factor in the jury's deliberations requires that the new evidence be
considered in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial."); see also Brescia, 29 N.E.3d
at 849 (utilizing "confluence of factors" standard).
33 See Commonwealth v. Rosario, 74 N.E.3d 599, 606 (Mass. 2017) (stating holding despite
disagreement on diagnosis). The Supreme Judicial Court diverted from the motion judge's
decision, stating that Rosario's DTs diagnosis did not constitute newly discovered evidence. Id.
However, the court found that Rosario deserved a new trial when reviewing the "confluence of
factors." Id.
34 See id at 607-08 (discussing how DTs diagnosis affects police interrogation process). The
court explains that unlike psychosis, DTs interferes with the brain's processing, ultimately creating
confusion. Id. at 607-08. The court went on to state that the jury may have decided differently on
the defendant's voluntariness if they had known the effects of DTs on Rosario. Id. Additionally, if
the jury was aware of this information and found Rosario's statement involuntary, the prosecution's
case would have been greatly diminished. Id
35 See id at 608 (emphasizing information from interpreter's affidavit). The affidavit revealed
that when the police drafted Rosario's statements, the officers not only incorporated their own
thoughts about Rosario starting the fire, but also failed to translate the third statement into Spanish
so that Rosario could understand it. Id.
36 See id. at 608-09 (acknowledging possibility of false confession). The court was quick to
explain that the interrogation strategies and the possibility of a false confession do not constitute

2017-18]

DISSIPATION OF REASONABLE DILIGENCE

231

court found these particular techniques problematic when a suspect is easily
manipulated and not provided with a sufficient translation of their statements
to police.37
The court's reasoning then transitioned from the police interrogation
to the new fire science that was brought before the motion judge.38 The court
recognized that the defense attorney in the first trial did not counter any of
the evidence provided by the prosecution's fire experts.3 9 The court reasoned
that while the new fire science does not eliminate the theory of arson, it offers
another understanding of how the fire originated, and demonstrates that burn
40
patterns are not enough to establish that flammable liquid created the fire.
The court found that with this new evidence, the Commonwealth would need
to prove more to satisfy its burden for arson.4 1 Ultimately, the court found
that the motion judge did not abuse her discretion in granting a new trial
because the new fire evidence-as well as the combination of the DTs
diagnosis, the interpreter's affidavit, and the interrogation techniquescould have affected the jury's decision.4 2
The Rosariocourt correctly affirmed the new trial for Rosario on the
43
basis of the police interrogation, DTs diagnosis, and the new fire evidence.

newly discovered evidence, but that the court will "consider these flaws in evaluating whether
justice requires a new trial under the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 608. The court first
addressed how the police dishonestly told Rosario that a witness saw him in the area before the fire,
despite having been told by Rosario that he only approached the area to help people escape from
the burning building. Id. at 608-09. Second, the court recognized how the police compelled Rosario
to admit to the crime by emphasizing that if Rosario's friends were the ones who committed the
crime, they would probably frame him for it. Id. at 609. Finally, the court reviewed the third
interrogation strategy, honing in on the fact that police provided corroborating information to the
defendant, which Rosario soon embraced in his statements to the officers. Id. The court went into
detail, stating that Rosario was told by police that "he acted as a lookout for his friends; that there
were three points of origin for the fire; and that the fire was started with Molotov cocktails." Id.
17 See id. at 609 (explaining interrogation strategies cast doubt on defendant's confession).
The court also reasons that Rosario had notified police that he was unfamiliar with Molotov
cocktails. Id Further, until the last statement to police, Rosario had repeatedly explained that he
was at the crime scene to help people out of the burning building. Id.
38 See Rosario, 74 N.E.3d at 609 (discussing new fire evidence).
39 See id. (addressing lack of challenges made to experts).
* See id. (explaining relevance of new fire science and jury determinations).
41 See id. (establishing Commonwealth's burden is higher with presence of this fire science).
The court mentions that the fire evidence could have changed the way the jury viewed Rosario's
admission, in addition to whether the Commonwealth met its burden. Id.
42 Id. at 609 (affirming motion judge's ruling).
43 See Rosario, 74 N.E.3d at 609 (justifying necessity and validity of new trial); see also
Commonwealth v. Brescia, 29 N.E.3d 837, 849 (Mass. 2015) (using "confluence of factors"
standard). Instead of addressing each individual factor separately to see if there was a miscarriage
ofjustice, the court considered how the DTs diagnosis, the interrogation concerns, and the new fire
evidence worked collectively to create significant doubt in the defendant's conviction. Rosario, 74
N.E.3d at 609.
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Notably, however, the court mislabeled the DTs diagnosis as discoverable
evidence." The court operated under the literal notion that because the DTs
diagnosis was prevalent in the psychology field at the time of Rosario's trial,
it was accessible, and therefore discoverable evidence.4 5 Technically
speaking, the DTs diagnosis was an available diagnosis during the
psychiatrists' examination of Rosario." Despite this reality, whether the
diagnosis was available to the psychiatrist is not the test for newly discovered
evidence; rather, it's whether the evidence was reasonably discoverable at
the time of trial, with the burden on the defendant to reveal that "pretrial
diligence would not have uncovered the evidence."4 7 Under the standard
reiterated in Grace, the real issue becomes whether the diagnosis was
reasonably discoverable, and whether Rosario's counsel was reasonably
diligent in obtaining an accurate diagnosis for his client.48
See Rosario, 74 N.E.3d at 606 (finding evidence discoverable).
See id. at 606, n. 11 (stating DTs diagnosis was "widely recognized" at the time of Rosario's
trial); see also Commonwealth v. Shuman, 836 N.E.2d 1085, 1089-90 (Mass. 2005) (defining
discoverable evidence). In Shuman, the court explicitly labeled evidence discoverable because "it
was available prior to the trial." Id
46 See Stem et al., Current Approaches to the Recognition and Treatment
of Alcohol
Withdrawal and Delirium Tremens: "Old Wine in New Bottles" or "New Wine in Old Bottles",
"
45
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(2010),

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2947546/
(describing history of Delirium
Tremens). Outlining the history of DTs, Stem notes "[d]escriptions of alcohol withdrawal,
including delirium tremens (DTs), have filled the medical literature since the late 1700s. Decades
later in 1813, Pearson labeled alcohol withdrawal as 'brain fever' secondary to 'frequent and
excessive intoxication.' In that same year, Sutton coined the syndrome delirium tremens." Id
Rosario's trial took place in 1983, so DTs was an available diagnosis. Rosario, 74 N.E.3d at 601.
47 Commonwealth v. Grace, 491 N.E.2d 246,248 (Mass. 1986) (utilizing reasonable diligence
standard). See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 503 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (Mass. 1987) (acknowledging
diligence of lawyer in addressing newly discovered evidence); Brief for Defendant at 33,
Commonwealth v. Rosario, 74 N.E.3d 599 (Mass. 2017) (arguing for reasonable diligence standard
for newly discovered evidence). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts utilized this
reasonable diligence test in Grace in 1986, but only cites this case in their Rosario decision as
establishing the need for newly discoverable evidence-failing to recognize that this very case
utilizes a reasonable diligence standard for newly discovered evidence. Rosario, 74 N.E.3d at 606.
48 See Grace, 491 N.E.2d at 248 (stating counsel must exert reasonable
diligence in obtaining
evidence). Notably, this very standard is used in a 2005 Massachusetts case that is similar to
Rosario. See Commonwealth v. Buck, 835 N.E.2d 623, 624-27 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (finding
videotape evidence newly discovered evidence despite its availability at trial). In Buck, the court
addressed whether a surveillance videotape was newly discovered evidence, although it was
available during the first trial. Id. at 624-25. The court admitted the videotape to the jury in the
first trial, but prefaced to the jury that the video did not cover the entire day. Id at 625. Upon the
defendant's appeal, the appellate counsel learned that the videotape did cover the entire day, and
argued that this was newly discovered evidence since the first trial counsel was not aware of this.
Id. at 626-27. The video was critical to the trial, as it covered the entire day and corroborated the
defendant's alibi. Id. The lower court judge granted a new trial finding the evidence was newly
discovered. Id at 627. The Buck court agreed with the lower court judge rationalizing that
"[d]efense counsel was not obliged to search for something he did not know existed." Id. Here,
the burden on defense counsel was part of the decision process for deciding whether the piece of
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In a separate footnote, the court seems to answer this question in the
affirmative, noting
we cannot say that defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to discover it. He relied upon the expertise of
others-three psychiatrists who examined the defendant
while he was in custody opined that the defendant was
psychotic at the times they examined him, one opined only
that he was not suffering from a mental illness at the time of
questioning, and an expert witness retained by the defense
opined that the defendant was psychotic during the
interrogation-in a field in which the attorney was not
himself trained. It would be a high hurdle indeed to expect
counsel to continue to search for an alternative diagnosis
where he reasonably could not be expected to know that one
existed. See Commonwealth v. Buck, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 760,
764, 835 N.E.2d 623 (2005). This is especially so where
several different psychiatrists concluded that the defendant
had suffered from psychosis either during the interrogation
or after booking, even if the judge was later persuaded that
this diagnosis was incorrect.49
Commendably, the court understands the burden placed on lawyers
to do everything in their capacity to access a piece of relevant evidence.o It
is this very analysis that should have been the crux of their decision regarding
the DTs diagnosis."
It is important to note psychology diagnoses are not always one
hundred percent accurate-making it all the more difficult for a lawyer to
find the right diagnosis utilizing reasonable pretrial diligence.52 Therefore,
evidence was newly discovered. Id. In contrast, the Rosario court recognized this burden, but did
not include it in their analysis of whether the DTs diagnosis was newly discovered. Rosario, 74
N.E.3d at 606. The issue in Rosario is relatively similar, considering Rosario's initial defense
counsel did not have any reason to believe that the diagnosis was anything other than what the
multiple psychiatrists said it was: psychosis. Id. at 602-03; see also Brief for Defendant at 33,
Commonwealth v. Rosario, 74 N.E.3d 599 (Mass. 2017) (arguing for reasonable diligence standard
for newly discovered evidence).
49 Rosario, 74 N.E.3d at 608 n.13 (acknowledging the lawyer's diligence in obtaining
diagnosis).
5o See id. (acknowledging the burden on lawyers).
51 See id. at 607-08 (noting the weight the diagnosis could have had in the jury deliberations).

As the court pointed out, "there are substantial differences between psychosis and DTs that may
have made a real difference in the jury's verdict." Id.
52

See Kyung M. Song, DiagnosisofMental Illness Hinges on Doctor as Much as Symptoms,

THE SEATTLE TIMES,

Oct. 23,2003, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/health/diagnosis-
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even if Massachusetts did not adhere to a reasonable diligence standard for
newly discovered evidence, it certainly would behoove the state to adopt
one.53 Admittedly, labeling the DTs diagnosis discoverable did not hurt
Rosario's case; there was new fire evidence, and a plethora of issues
regarding his interview, which were exacerbated by the fact that he had
DTs.5 4 Notwithstanding the granting of a new trial for Rosario, postconviction relief is an uphill battle." The absence of a reasonable diligence
analysis for newly discovered evidence in Rosario could keep an innocent

of
(emphasizing
frequency
of-mental-illness-hinges-on-doctor-as-much-as-symptoms/
misdiagnosis because a diagnosis depends on a doctor's interpretation of symptoms). The article
states:
Despite the scientific wizardry of modem medicine, diagnosing mental disorders
remains a subjective exercise. Lacking genetic markers or brain scans to confirm
psychiatric illnesses, doctors identify schizophrenia, phobias and other mental disorders
based on a much more primitive diagnostic aid-the symptoms. The universal screening
tool for clinicians in the United States is an 886-page tome called the "Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders" (DSM), published by the American Psychiatric
Association. The DSM contains a checklist of symptoms and the minimum number of
them that must be present in order to meet the requirements for each disorder. By
standardizing the classifications of symptoms, the DSM is intended to ensure uniformity
in diagnoses. Yet people with mental disorders too often are misdiagnosed or not
diagnosed at all . . . Another problem: A single patient may get different diagnoses
according to which doctor he sees. That's especially likely when two distinct conditions,
such as anxiety disorders and depression, produce similar symptoms.
Id. On a narrower scale, psychosis itself can simply be a symptom of a larger issue, causing more
disarray in diagnoses. See Oliver Freudenreich, Differential Diagnosis of Psychotic Symptoms:
Medical
"Mimics ",
PSYCHIATRIC
TIMES
(Dec.
3,
2010),
http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/all/editorial/psychiatrictimes/pdfs/2010cme-PT205426Freudenreigh.pdf. Doctor Freudenreich discusses how there are a variety of medical diseases that
consist of psychotic symptoms. Id. Freudenreigh writes, "Psychosis is a frequent ancillary
symptom of delirium that can overshadow its cardinal cognitive features. It is therefore critical to
routinely consider the possibility of a delirium in any patient with psychosis." Id. (citations
omitted). Accordingly, it would make sense to utilize a standard for newly discovered evidence
that recognizes the subjectivity of the mental health field, and the burden on lawyers to have to
make sure they get the accurate diagnosis for their clients. Id; see also Commonwealth v. Rosario,
74 N.E.3d 599, 608 (Mass. 2017) (acknowledging difficulty for lawyer to find accurate diagnosis
for clients).
5 See Freudenreich, supra note 52 (referring to the unpredictability of diagnoses).
54 See Commonwealth v. Rosario, 74 N.E.3d 599, 609 (Mass. 2017) (concluding that Rosario
deserved new trial due to variety of factors).
ss See Shannon Padgett, Post Conviction Relief-One Last Chance, DALE CARSON L. (Jan. 1,
2015), http://www.dalecarsonlaw.com/one-last-chance/ (discussing the difficulty of postconviction motions). Padgett writes, "[t]he law for post-conviction motions are complicated and
make it difficult to win. The defendant must argue specific legal grounds in order to be successful.
There are also deadlines to file these motions." Id.

2017-18]

DISSIPATION OFREASONABLE DILIGENCE

235

defendant-seeking relief solely based on a new psychological diagnosisincarcerated.5 6
In the context of a Rule 30 review, the Rosario court addressed
whether new fire science and a new psychological diagnosis for Rosario
constituted newly discovered evidence. The court ultimately held that the
fire evidence was newly discovered, but the DTs diagnosis was discoverable
because it was available at the time of trial. The court failed to apply the
reasonable diligence standard to Rosario's DTs diagnosis, which could have
detrimental effects for future defendants seeking post-conviction relief
solely based on a different diagnosis.
Lauren C. Simard

56

See Rosario, 74 N.E.3d at 606, n.11 (lacking discussion of reasonable pretrial diligence on

part of defendant's lawyer).
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